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Abstract:  The neoclassical trade model has notoriously been unable to empirically predict trade 
flows throughout the world, however there has been a notion that the same theories and 
predictions could also be applied to democratic voting on free trade legislation.  Using roll-call 
votes on three 2011 United States bilateral trade agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South 
Korea, respectively, a simple empirical model based on the neoclassical concepts, specifically the 
Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson corollary theorems, is outlined. After an analysis using a 
logit estimation method, it is revealed that there is conflicting evidence whether the voting on the 
2011 free trade agreements follow the initial predictions given by the model, indicating that the 
representatives did not explicitly take into account district skill level while voting.  However, the 
results do support that there is certainly a driving factor within the industrial composition of the 
district, as well as key political and economic components that help explain the voting behavior of 
Congress. 
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1. Introduction 
Standard international trade theory has historically struggled to hold up empirically in 
terms of being able to predict countries’ trade patterns and volume.  This is most famously 
demonstrated by the “Leontief Paradox” (Leontief, 1953), which exposed the inconsistencies of 
the United States’ trade flows based on its resource abundance.  Indeed, even after correcting 
for the misspecifications of Leontief’s model, Leamer (1984) shows that it is still difficult to 
accurately predict trade between countries based on the neoclassical principles. Rather than 
trying to continue this line of research and rearrange the model to fit the actual trade flows of 
countries it would be equally interesting to discover if the initial decision to legislate free trade 
in fact follows these same neoclassical theories.  Thus, bilateral free trade agreements are a 
perfect platform to test whether legislators in a democratic voting system utilize standard trade 
theory in their decision making process.      
On October 12, 2011, the United States’ 112th Congress passed three separate bilateral 
free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea, respectively.1 Since this was a 
period of highly publicized partisan divide, it is fascinating that three pieces of trade legislation 
passed all within the same day. The simple fact of this occurrence perhaps signals how 
important many in Congress believe that the role of trade could play in facilitating an economic 
recovery during a time of distress.  What drives this perception that foreign trade is important 
to economic growth however?  Indeed, this emphasis on trade liberalization has been at the 
heart of U.S. development strategies in its own past, and also as a prescription for the rest of 
the world (export-oriented growth is a main pillar of the ‘Washington Consensus’). Of course, 
examining the standard neoclassical trade theory, one can conclude that all countries are better 
off through trade based on their comparative advantage in productive capabilities.  From the 
perspective of a Congressional representative however, does one base their decision to vote in 
favor of liberalized trade on that actual comparative advantage logic, given the economic 
and/or political composition of their state or district?2 
Using the Heckscher-Ohlin model as a basis for standard neoclassical trade theory, two 
predictions emerge from the comparative advantage reasoning to help characterize the 
expected voting decisions of a representative.  First, according to the Heckscher-Ohlin 
                                                          
1 The agreements with Colombia and Panama are both technically “Trade Promotion” Agreements (TPA).  For all 
purposes in this thesis they are the same as a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). 
 
2 Henceforth, referencing a representative’s district also applies for a reference to a Senator’s state. 
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Theorem, there is an expectation that a country’s relative factor abundance will dictate their 
trade patterns.  Second, the corollary Stolper-Samuelson Theorem predicts that there will be 
real ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in each country as a result of trade, again based on the relative factor 
abundance.  If the scale of these predictions are then reduced to the U.S. Congressional district 
level, it can be expected that the votes of the representatives should reflect the relative resource 
abundance of their respective district.  This is especially true for the Stolper-Samuelson 
Theorem, since representatives will ideally seek to benefit their constituents with an affirming 
vote if they are deemed to be ‘winners’ if free trade legislation is passed.  On the other hand, if 
their constituents would be termed as ‘losers’ as a result of trade, then they would seek to 
protect their district by voting against the passage of trade liberalizing legislation.  Thus, the 
objective of this thesis is to construct an empirical model to test whether the votes on the three 
2011 free trade agreements reflects these theorems, after controlling for a number of political 
and economic variables.  Importantly the empirical model, which is outlined in section 3.1, uses 
the skill level of a district, defined by university educational attainment, as a proxy for resource 
abundance. 
Previewing the results displayed in section 4, after separate logit estimations for all 
three agreements, it is revealed that the skill level of a Congressional district does not explicitly 
confirm the expectations of the neoclassical model when controlling for the comprehensive list 
of representative and district specific variables. There is significant evidence however that there 
are industrial drivers, particularly in the agricultural industry, that explain the voting 
tendencies.  Since these industrial drivers are factor based, it can be additionally argued that the 
Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson Theorems are playing a role in the voting to some 
degree, even if it is not within the scope of the initial model.  Furthermore, the additional 
results give a great deal of insight into the trade voting behavior of lawmakers, and are of great 
interest with regards to policymaking.  The conclusions from this thesis can be useful in 
determining prime factors in Congress that can lead to an improved likelihood of passing trade 
liberalizing legislation in the future. 
1.1 Free Trade Agreements 
The three 2011 bilateral free trade agreements between the United States and 
Colombia, Panama, and South Korea, respectively, have been negotiated over a long period of 
time, originally introduced by the Bush administration in 2007.  Interestingly, they have been 
passed with a relatively low-level of fanfare, certainly compared to the controversial North 
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the 1990’s.  They also serve as the most recent 
bilateral trade agreements the U.S. has signed in the past six years, the last being a bilateral 
agreement with Peru in 2007.  Perhaps most revealing is that these agreements passed during a 
time of well-publicized partisan gridlock in Congress.  The passage of all three was seen as a 
victory for President Obama and those in Congress that believe that freer trade is a remedy for 
a recession. Table 1 shows the voting breakdown for all three agreements.3  The following sub-
sections are brief summaries for each agreement.4 
1.1.1 Colombia TPA 
 The trade promotion agreement with Colombia was the most controversial of the three, 
particularly with regards to the lack of perceived labor union rights within the country.5 The 
agreement, upon implementation, eliminates tariffs on more than 80% of industrial good 
exports from the U.S. to Colombia, and will phase out the remaining barriers over a period of 
ten years.  Importantly, more than half of the U.S. agricultural exports to Colombia became 
duty-free upon implementation.  Another key industrial area included greater access to the 
Colombian services markets, as well as stronger intellectual property rights.  Overall, upon 
enactment, the average tariff rate on U.S. exports reduces from 10.8% to 4.0%. 
1.1.2 Panama TPA 
 The agreement with Panama gained the greatest number of votes from Congress, and 
upon implementation immediately eliminates over 87% of the tariffs on U.S. industrial good 
exports (with the same phase out period of ten years for the remainder).  Again, the major area 
of interest was the agricultural industry, which similarly had over 50 percent of exports 
declared to be duty-free.  The services market was also a key industry (again offering stronger 
intellectual property rights), as well as potential infrastructure opportunities in the Panama 
Canal expansion project, as well as several other major projects.  Overall, upon implementation, 
the average tariff rate on U.S. exports reduces from 7.0% to 3.3%. 
 
 
                                                          
3 For a more in depth analysis of the votes, refer to section 3.2. 
 
4 As documented by the office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the International Trade Association (ITA). 
 
5 As reported by the New York Times in an article titled “Congress Ends 5-Year Standoff on Trade Deals in Rare 
Accord” by Applebaum and Steinhauer published on October 12, 2011. 
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1.1.3 South Korea FTA 
 Of the three countries, South Korea has the largest economy and the agreement is 
predicted to have the largest impact in the U.S.6  Upon implementation, nearly 80% of U.S. 
industrial good exports became duty-free, with the rest of the tariffs being phased out over the 
ten year period.  About two-thirds of the tariffs on agricultural goods exported to South Korea 
became non-existent, and greater access to the services market was negotiated (with the same 
intellectual property rights conditions as the other two FTA’s).  Of particular note with the 
South Korea agreement was the emphasis on reducing barriers on automobile tariffs.  Overall, 
the average tariff rate reduces from 6.2% to 1.1% on all U.S. exports to South Korea. 
2.  Congressional Voting and Trade Theory 
2.1 Neoclassical Trade Theory 
Before the literature with regard to trade legislation is examined, it is useful to similarly 
review neoclassical trade theory and the theorems that are at the foundation of this thesis’ 
analytical objectives.7  
 The neoclassical model is an updated version of David Ricardo’s classical model which 
first demonstrated the concept of comparative advantage.  This theory of comparative 
advantage implies that any two countries can benefit as a result of trade based on their relative 
opportunity costs of labor in the production of two goods.  The neoclassical model incorporates 
this crucial concept (and the two good assumption) but improves on its classical predecessor by 
including increasing opportunity costs (curved production possibility frontier), an additional 
factor of production (capital as well as labor, for example), and explicit demand considerations 
(it takes into account the preferences of the country in question).  Thus the neoclassical trade 
model provides a microeconomic demonstration in how a country can gain from trade by 
manipulating relative price lines (going from autarky to openness) in view of their production 
possibility frontier and indifference curves. 
 The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model is an extension of this neoclassical theory in that it 
displays the basis for trade between two countries.  Among the numerous assumptions of the 
H-O model, the key tenants are:  the two goods, two countries and two factors of production 
(whose initial levels are fixed and assumed to be relatively different for each country) 
                                                          
6 According to the ITA. 
 
7 The neoclassical model detailed in this section is adapted from that of Appleyard, Field and Cobb (2010) 
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framework; the two goods have different relative factor intensities in their production process; 
and finally, the factors are perfectly mobile within each country but not mobile across borders.  
Thus the first major conclusion of the H-O model is the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) Theorem, 
which states:  a country will export the good or service that uses relatively intensively its 
relatively abundant factor of production, and it will import the good that uses relatively 
intensively its relatively scarce factor of production. 
 While this H-O Theorem is the essential basis for trade between two countries, and the 
basic concept of comparative advantage entails that both countries will be better off from that 
trade, the corollary Stolper-Samuelson (S-S) Theorem characterizes the income distribution 
effects of trade.  This S-S Theorem can be formally explained:  with full employment both 
before and after trade takes place, the increase in the price of the abundant factor and the fall of 
the price of the scarce factor due to trade imply that the owners of the abundant factor will find 
their real incomes rising and the owners of the scarce factor will find their real incomes falling.  
This broadly means that when trade opens, as a result of a higher demand for an exportable 
good (intensive in the abundant factor), the price of that good will increase and the seller will 
be better off.  Conversely, as a result of importing the good that’s intensive in the scarce factor, 
the price of that good will go down and will hurt the domestic seller of that good. 
 Hence this neoclassical framework and the two corollary theorems that come out of it 
can be used to display not only how countries come to their reasons for initiating trade (like 
legislating a FTA for example) but also that there are real winners and losers in a country as a 
result of that same trade. These two conclusions from the neoclassical theory explains both the 
support many have for trade liberalization as well as the opposition, despite the fact that the 
country as a whole benefits in the end.  It is then not surprising that there are competing 
parties within countries that are in favor of trade liberalizing legislation (the owners of the 
relatively abundant factor) and those that are against it (the owners of the relatively scarce 
factor).  In a democratic society, it is reasonable to expect that a legislative representative 
considers which category of factor ownership his/her constituents are classified as and will vote 
accordingly when a free trade agreement is on the docket. 
2.2 Literature Review 
The literature on Congressional voting habits with regards to international trade 
legislation is well covered; however there has been significantly more focus on the political and 
industrial factors that influence votes rather than the theoretical implications of the neoclassical 
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model.  This thesis is expressly interested in testing whether the S-S Theorem in particular 
holds in the roll-call votes on the three separate FTAs that were passed in both chambers of the 
U.S. Congress on October 12, 2011, using the skill level of a district as a proxy for the factor 
abundance.  Considering that the majority of the work already established in this field has 
revealed that district factors along with political dynamics are significant in the legislative 
decision-making process, it is vital to account for these while trying to capture the effect of the 
factor allocations.  Specifically, this literature review focuses on four of these influential topics 
that are extensively examined in the field:  the industrial composition of districts; the 
unemployment rate; the contributions received by representatives from political action 
campaigns (PACs); and the political party of a representative.  The review also includes a 
discussion of the use of skill as a factor proxy. 
 Unsurprisingly the voting on the 2011 FTAs display similar results with regards to the 
economic and political indicators mentioned above, although this research is unique to the 
literature in that it benefits from the fact that all three of the agreements passed by Congress 
were done on the same day.  While the papers that solely look at NAFTA (Kahane, 1996; Kang 
and Greene, 1999), do not suffer from any time variation, they lack the scope of multiple 
agreements.  Conversely, the papers that examine multiple deals (Beaulieu, 2002; Baldwin and 
Magee, 2000; Im and Sung, 2011) capture the diversity in issues of dealing with many 
countries, but then lack the benefit of dealing with the same political and economic climates.  
The structure of this type of roll-call vote analysis utilized in the literature however is broadly 
the same, and has been modeled and econometrically tested (via logit or probit) consistently 
throughout. 
 The work most closely related to this research is that of Beaulieu (2002), as he examines 
whether the S-S Theorem is evident in the voting on three different pieces of trade legislation:  
the Canadian-United States FTA (CUSTA), NAFTA, and the Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  Beaulieu’s sole motivation however is not to 
explicitly determine whether the neoclassical theorem holds in Congress, but rather to reveal 
whether the rest of the literature is correct for assuming perfect factor mobility between 
industries, thus allowing to draw certain theoretical conclusions from district-industry based 
models.  This concept of perfect factor mobility is crucial to the interpretation of the S-S 
Theorem in this setting. If this assumption holds, then the explicit factor allocation of a district 
is irrelevant and the S-S Theorem will be reflected through the industrial employment 
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composition. Beaulieu calls this the “factor-detachment” corollary of the S-S Theorem.  His 
results indicate that indeed the industrial approach is an effective one, but also produces 
evidence that the factors of production could in fact determine trade policy as well.  Thus he 
concludes that the factor-detachment assumption is only partially true and additional analysis 
of explicit factor allocation is warranted.  This latter revelation is the basis for the hypothesis 
and model in this thesis, and the results mirror that of Beaulieu’s.  It also allows for some 
flexibility in interpreting whether the S-S Theorem holds in the case of the 2011 FTAs, as it 
could also be speculated that the S-S Theorem is reflected through the industrial composition if 
the assumption of factor detachment is partially accepted. 
 In the empirical model specified in section 3.1, the skill level of a district (which is the 
proxy for factor abundance) is represented by the educational attainment of the district, or 
rather, the percentage of the workforce with a Bachelor’s degree or above.  This type of factor 
proxy is in keeping with Beaulieu (2002) and Kang and Greene (1999) as far as the trade 
literature is concerned:  they both find that skill was a significant, positive determinant of 
support for NAFTA.   Educational attainment is also a standard measure of skill in the 
immigration legislation literature:  Facchini and Steinhardt (2011) use educational attainment 
as their main variable of interest in trying to discover what drives U.S. immigration policy.  
Facchini and Steinhardt set up their study from a specific factors model perspective, which is 
closely related to the Heckscher-Ohlin framework. Indeed, their model was used as a guide and 
closely resembles that outlined in section 3.1.  
 As indicated previously, the majority of the literature follows models that focus on the 
industrial composition of districts.  Kahane (1996) and Kang and Greene (1999) take this 
approach to analyze NAFTA, and playing to the rhetoric of the time,8 cluster district industries 
into two groups.  These groups are classified as either ‘winners’ or ‘losers’, and are based on the 
predicted trade as a result of NAFTA passing.9  They both find limited evidence that 
representatives’ votes were influenced by the composition of potential winners and losers in 
their respective districts, a result that closely follows the S-S Theorem.  The more common 
approach to broader studies that focus on multiple agreements with different countries is to 
                                                          
8 Kahane mentions in his introduction former presidential candidate Ross Perot and his infamous comments on the 
specific industries that stood to lose from a free trade agreement with Mexico. 
 
9 If the industry was expected to increase its exports, it was grouped as a winner.  If an industry was an import 
competing sector, then they were grouped as a loser.  Kang and Greene (1999) actually use the terms “gainers” and 
“losers”. 
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simply group the industries into ‘export’ or ‘import’ classifications or ratios (Beaulieu, 2002; 
Dennis et al., 2000; Conconi et al., 2011).  Since the 2011 agreements deal with three countries 
with fairly heterogeneous economies, there is no grouping of industries into specific export or 
import orientations.  This seems necessary since the U.S. may have a comparative advantage 
over Panama in one industry, but could likely be at a comparative disadvantage to South Korea 
and/or Colombia in that same industry. It will be more informative to then allow for the 
varying results in the industries from one agreement to the next.  This interest in the variation 
from country to country is the rationale that Baldwin and Magee (2000) use when they analyze 
not only NAFTA and GATT, but the vote on the Most Favored Nation (MFN) status of China 
in 1994 as well.  No matter how the grouping or presentation of results however, it seems that 
there is a consistent trend that the industrial composition of a district does in fact play a 
significant role in determining trade policy. 
 Other district economic factors are influential in the literature as well, but since the 
2011 FTAs were signed during a recession and at a time of well-publicized unemployment,10 
the district unemployment rate is of key interest.  The unemployment rate as a control variable 
is a fixture throughout most of the literature; however Kono (2011) purposefully investigates 
the link between trade policy and unemployment.  He finds that the unemployment rate of 
Congressional districts negatively influence the likelihood of a representative voting in favor of 
free trade legislation (his main finding is that greater social insurance can actually improve the 
likelihood of freer trade).  Indeed this empirical result is fairly commonplace throughout the 
literature, but it is important to take into account the social theory behind the negative 
perception of trade in times of high unemployment.  Adsera and Boix (2002) delve deeper into 
this social theory of trade legislation, including unemployment in an analysis which focuses 
around the median-voter approach.  Intuitively thinking, and keeping the S-S Theorem in 
mind, it is surprising that the unemployment rate has a negative influence on free trade voting.  
If anything, it would be expected to be ambiguous, since factor abundant districts would see 
unemployment decrease as a result of trade (in a rigid wage structure), and the opposite should 
hold true for factor scarce districts. 
 The political tendencies of the representatives themselves are equally important to the 
district factors, from a theoretical and logical perspective.  The PAC contributions received by 
representatives and the impact they have on trade legislation voting has been comprehensively 
                                                          
10 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the national unemployment rate was at 9.0% in October 2011 
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examined in the literature, whether as a main subject of study (Hasnat and Callahan, 2002; 
Baldwin and Magee, 2000; Im and Sung, 2011) or as an additional control to other interests 
(Kang and Greene, 1999; Beaulieu, 2002; Kaempfer and Marks, 2003; O’Roark, 2012; Nollen 
and Quinn, 1994).  Nearly the entire literature groups PACs into two categories:  labor and 
business/corporate.  This fits nicely into the S-S Theorem, as the owners of labor (labor PACs) 
and the owners of capital (corporate PACs) are expected to experience an increase or decrease 
in real wages as a result of trade, depending on the relative factor endowments. The results for 
the U.S. (largely considered as relatively abundant in capital compared to most nations) have 
been fairly straightforward:  labor PACs have a negative influence on voting while corporate 
PACs either have a positive or insignificant impact.  Hasnat and Callahan (2002) for example, 
look at Congressional voting on Chinese Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status in 
2000 and find evidence that both PAC contributions were predictively influential. A more 
comparative study to this thesis was done by Im and Sung (2011), where they reveal that PAC 
contributions were significant (with expected signs) for seven FTAs voted on by the 108th and 
109th Congresses.11   
 Another political piece that is important to consider when any type of Congressional 
voting analysis is done is the party affiliation of the representative.  Even though the 2011 
FTAs were passed at a time of extreme partisanship, there was clearly not a complete deadlock 
based on party affiliation, and all three managed to pass through both chambers relatively 
easily.12 However, to understand the marginal degree in which voting follows the party line is 
very important with regards to future agreements.  Conconi et al. (2011) look at the votes on 
all trade liberalizing bills from the Trade Act of 1974 to the DR-CAFTA agreement in 2005 
and find that Democrats were significantly less likely to vote in favor of the bills while 
Republicans were more likely.  This result has been broadly hypothesized and confirmed 
throughout the literature, although Kahane (1996) and Kang and Greene (1999) show that this 
was not necessarily that strong of a case in NAFTA.  They both speculate that the relatively 
insignificant impact of party affiliation may have been due to the public exposure given to the 
debate around NAFTA.  Representatives may have had to prove that they were looking at the 
ratio of prospective winners and losers as a result of NAFTA’s passage rather than vote along a 
party line.   
                                                          
11 Im and Sung (2011) use a probit-tobit model, the same used by Baldwin and Magee (2000) 
 
12 For graphical representations of the votes, see Figures i and ii in the appendix. 
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An interesting corollary study conducted by Magee (2010) shows that in the case of 
trade legislation, the party of the President is also a contributing factor.  In the case of 
NAFTA, he shows that there would be a diminished chance of the trade agreement passing in 
the House of Representatives if Bush had been elected rather than Clinton in 1992. Likewise, 
there is a very likely chance that the trade promotion authority granted to Bush in 2001 or 
CAFTA signed in 2005 would not have passed under a Democratic President.  Note that in 
2011, there was a Democratic President, a Republican-controlled House and a Democrat-
controlled Senate. 
 The literature in the trade legislation realm for the most part reaffirms itself, drawing 
many of the same economic and political conclusions when analyzing different agreements.  
That is not to say each bill does not require an analysis of the roll-call votes; quite the opposite 
in fact, as is the case of international economics, when dealing with different countries, vastly 
different circumstances and assumptions are made.  What this thesis offers from the literature’s 
point of view is a basic neoclassical interpretation of voting with the unique benefit of three 
votes all on the same day.  As Beaulieu (2002) points out as well, the factor approach is one that 
is relatively neglected in the field, and a comprehensive factor/industry analysis is rare. This 
research builds on Beaulieu’s factor model assessment and determines whether the S-S 
Theorem in particular can explain voting behavior in Congress. 
3.  Methodology 
3.1 Empirical Model 
In order to properly analyze the voting behavior of representatives in Congress, it is 
appropriate to consider a relatively simple model that uses the H-O organization described in 
Section 2.1 as a guiding framework.  To accomplish this, the actual situation can dictate the 
structure.  There are three cases of bilateral trade agreements, so the assumption of only two 
countries (for each agreement) is validated.  For the purpose of evaluating the S-S Theorem, 
the assumption that there are only two factors that go into the production of two types of 
goods and services can be made.  To most effectively test this theorem, the factor concept can 
be defined from a skilled labor perspective. This theoretical framework based on skilled labor is 
similar to that used by Facchini and Steinhardt (2011) in their analysis of voting behavior with 
regards to immigration legislation.  The H-O model typically uses capital and labor as the two 
factors of production.  In this case, high-skilled labor is a proxy for capital while low-skilled is a 
proxy for labor.  Thus the same conclusions based on these assumptions can be drawn. 
11 
 
Each Congressional district i is populated by two sets of workers:  low-skilled and high-
skilled. These high-skilled workers produce two sets of goods and services:  those that use 
high-skilled labor relatively more intensively, and those that use low-skilled labor relatively 
more intensively.  In relation to the trade agreements, it can be assumed that, as a whole, the 
U.S. is relatively more abundant in high-skilled labor with respect to all three countries (this 
will most likely hold with any future negotiations with another developing country as well).  
This assumption thus leads to the belief, according to the H-O Theorem, that any district 
within the U.S. that has a greater relative share of high-skilled labor will increase their exports 
as a result of any trade agreement passing.  This assertion should then be reflected by that 
district’s representative’s voting on the trade agreement in this simple model.  Voting yea on an 
agreement is seen as liberalizing trade, which would imply an increase in exports for goods that 
production uses relatively more intensively high-skilled labor as an input, and according to the 
S-S theorem, an increase in the real income of high-skilled workers.  Conversely, this would 
also mean an increase in imports of the goods and services that production uses relatively more 
intensively low-skilled labor as an input, which would imply that low-skilled labor in the U.S. is 
the import-competing factor of production (and would thus see their real wages decrease). This 
leads to the hypothesis statement: 
H0: β ≤ 0 : The skill level of a district has a negative or no effect on voting in 
favor of a trade liberalizing bill. 
HA: β > 0 : The skill level of a district has a positive effect on voting in favor of a 
trade liberalizing bill. 
Representatives are presumed to consider several additional aspects while voting on any type of 
legislation, and trade issues are no different.  Thus to properly test this hypothesis it is 
necessary to also incorporate a series of controls that cover not only economic factors within 
the respective district but also the political and personal characteristics of the man or woman 
that is voting.  Many of these controls have been prefaced in the literature review (section 2.2), 
however a more complete explanation as well as a detailed methodology for all data is 
considered in section 3.2.  For now however, an econometric specification of the empirical 
model can be presented. 
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To assess the hypothesis that the skill level of a district has a positive effect on voting in 
favor of a trade liberalizing bill, a logit model can be used to econometrically estimate: 
 
Prob(Voteij = 1|Si,Xi,Zi) = F(β0 + β1Si + β2Xi + β3Zi) 
 
Where Voteij is the yea vote (1) or nay vote (0) by representative i for legislation regarding 
liberalizing trade with country j, Si is the percentage of high-skilled laborers in the workforce of 
district i, Xi is a vector of the representative-specific variables and Zi is a vector of the district-
specific variables.  Thus, the dichotomous choice of voting yea or nay on a trade liberalizing 
bilateral agreement with country j  is a function of district i’s skill level along with vectors of 
district-specific and representative-specific control variables. 
 The use of the logit estimation method in this case is fairly straightforward considering 
the binary nature of the dependent variables.  It is assumed that the probability of voting yea on 
any agreement conditional on the specified vectors is a non-linear function.  This is done to 
avoid any issues regarding heteroskedasticity in the errors or inaccurate interpretations of 
marginal effects that would be consistent with the use of a linear probability model in this case.  
Given this conjecture of non-linear conditional probability, by simply making another 
assumption that the errors are distributed over the logistical function, the justification of using 
the logit model over the probit is appropriate.  Indeed, the same justification for the logit 
method is seen throughout the literature, particularly in Beaulieu (2002) and Kahane (1996), 
which both reflect similar data and research objectives.  Furthermore, when the results are 
presented, a more accurate expression of the marginal effects are given in order to explain the 
change in the probability of voting in favor of a trade agreement when there is a unit change in 
a single covariate, holding all other variables constant. 
3.2 Data  
All data were collected from a variety of secondary sources, and the summary statistics 
are displayed in Table 2.  
3.2.1 Roll-Call Votes 
The roll-call votes for all three trade bills were taken from the Library of Congress’ 
THOMAS database for the 112th Congress (First Session), which recorded the voting results 
for both the House of Representatives and the Senate on H.R. 3078 (A bill to implement the 
United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement), H.R. 3079 (A bill to implement the United 
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States-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement), and H.R. 3080 (A bill to implement the United States-
Korea Free Trade Agreement.), respectively. These votes are the dependent variables in the logit 
model.  The summary of the roll-call votes on all three agreements are displayed in Table 1, 
with the voting distributions separated into several different groups.   
This voting breakdown exhibited in Table 1 presents a quick glance at the results of the 
model.  All three agreements were overwhelmingly supported by Republicans (lowest 
percentage was 92% in favor of the Korea FTA), while the majority of Democrats voted against 
all three (52.6%).  Most notably Democrats were against the Colombian agreement, which only 
received yea votes from 21.90% of the party.  Interestingly, there are 88 voters that “flipped” on 
either one or two of the agreements, or rather did not vote uniformly on all three bills. This 
would lead to the belief that different economic and political factors may be more or less 
influential depending on the specific agreement, as well as show that the degree of comparative 
advantage between the U.S. and the three countries respectively differ.  If this latter scenario is 
the case, then it would be expected that different coefficients on the industrial sectors exist for 
each respective agreement. 
3.2.2 District-Specific Variables 
The main variable of interest, skill level, is measured by educational attainment, 
specifically the percentage of district working population that has received a Bachelor’s degree 
or higher.  This data is drawn from the 2010 United States Census, which provides district-
level data from the 111th US Congress.13The decision to use educational attainment as the 
proxy for skill level is vital to this analysis, although it is far from the perfect measure in terms 
of quantifying a district’s factor endowment.  However, because of the framework of the 
empirical model, it is the most valid representation. 
 The U.S. Census is also used for the employment figures for the district industrial 
sectors.  These statistics display the percentage of working population employed in each 
respective industry within a single district.  The industrial sectors that are presented in Table 1 
are the sectors which produce goods and services that are considered tradable.14  The Retail 
and Wholesale Trade sectors are consolidated into one category, while the variable “High Skill 
                                                          
13 The fact that the district lines are drawn for the 111th Congress is not a problem since the re-drawing of some 
Congressional districts will not come into effect until the 113th US Congress is in session, so we can safely assume that 
the composition of the districts in the 2010 US Census accurately reflects the conditions that faced the 112th Congress. 
 
14 The methodology used to classify tradable services follows Jensen (2011), who creates a Gini index in order to rank 
industries from least tradable to highly tradable (1-3).  The services industries included in the regressions are industries 
which have an index score of 3 (highly tradable) and/or are relevant to the agreements. 
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Services” is a composite of three sectors:  Information; Banking and Finance; and Professional, 
Scientific, and Technical Services. The industrial employment data for each district is an 
important aspect in determining the role that the skill level proxy plays within the estimations, 
as it is expected that the employment in the import and export competing industries will also 
be very influential and the effects are anticipated to vary from country to country (relative to 
the U.S.). 
Similarly, the percentage of Asians and Hispanics in each districts’ workforce are drawn 
on from the U.S. Census.  Intuitively, and without being too general, there could be an 
expectation that a district with a greater percentage share employment in either of these ethnic 
groups could be more likely to vote in favor of at least one agreement (greater percentage of 
Asians for the South Korea agreement; greater percentage of Hispanics for either Panama 
and/or Colombia).  There may be cultural links between businesses and/or migration trends, 
for example, that could support this claim.      
The unemployment figure used in the model is the rate at the time of the actual vote, 
October 2011.  The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides the data at the county level, 
and that county level data was manually transferred to the district level by taking the average 
of the unemployment rates for all counties within the district.  The unemployment rate is 
expected to have a negative effect on a representative’s vote in favor of liberalizing trade.  In 
times of high level of joblessness, it is anticipated that free trade is generally an unpopular 
policy initiative (Kono 2011). 
3.2.3 Representative-Specific Variables  
To control for the representatives’ own personal and political preferences towards trade, 
it is important to include three components.  The first is the party affiliation, as it is expected 
that this will be a significant factor in voting yea or nay on trade legislation.  Generally, it is 
anticipated that Republicans are more ideologically inclined towards free trade, and as 
previously mentioned, looking at the breakdown of the roll-call votes for the agreements in 
Table 1, this looks to be the case.  The party affiliation is drawn from the same THOMAS 
database that was used for the roll-call votes.  It also should be noted that representatives who 
are listed as “Independent” are included with the Democrats.15 
                                                          
15 There are only two, both in the Senate:  Joseph Lieberman (CT) and Bernard Sanders (VT).  Lieberman is a former 
member of the Democratic Party while Sanders considers himself a democratic socialist.  
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 Likewise, it is necessary to control for whether the representative is a member of the 
House of Representatives or the Senate.  This data is also taken from the THOMAS database 
and is mainly important to account for because the House Representatives are concerned with 
the welfare of their district only (in terms of the model) while Senators are responsible for the 
welfare of their entire state.  This unit-level difference in the data must be controlled for; 
although it is not inherently believed that one chamber of Congress would be more in favor of 
trade than the other.  However, looking at Table 1 clearly all three agreements were supported 
more in the Senate than in the House. 
 The last aspect of the representative controls are the PAC contributions.  It is expected 
that labor organizations in the U.S. are generally against free trade.  Traditionally, labor 
organizations (more specifically labor unions) have been against freer trade that could put 
domestic workers out of jobs.  Thus according to the S-S theorem it is assumed that the labor 
PAC contributions come from the owners of labor (low-skilled laborers that are predicted to 
see their real incomes decline according to the model).  These labor contributions then are 
expected to have a negative impact on a representative’s vote in favor of any of the trade 
agreements.16  Likewise, if it is believed that corporate PAC contributions come from the 
owners of capital (high-skilled), it would be expected that donations of this nature would then 
have a positive effect on the probability of a yea vote.  The data for the PAC contributions 
comes from the Federal Election Commission (the 2010 election circuit), and the classifications 
into “Labor” or “Corporate” are aided by OpenSecrets.org.  
 Finally, regional fixed-effects are included in all specifications in order to capture any 
correlations in voting that may exist in different parts of the country.  There are four regions:  
Northeast, South, Midwest, and West.  All models run with state fixed-effects rather than 
regional fixed-effects are also included as a robustness check.  The comparison between the two 
methods for each model specification can be found in the appendix.  Robust standard errors, 
clustered at the state level, are used throughout all specifications as well.  This is done to 
ensure that any state-based correlations in the standard errors are accounted for.  
 
 
 
                                                          
16 While this is the theoretical prediction, there is also empirical evidence from NAFTA (Kahane, 1996; Kang et. al 1999) 
that this is what we observe. 
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4.  Results 
Table 4 contains the results for the logit estimations of the comprehensive model for 
each agreement.  Immediately it can be seen that the coefficient on skill level is insignificant in 
all three agreements, so it can be concluded that the relative factor abundance of a district, as 
defined by the level of educational attainment, has no impact on a representative’s vote.  Thus 
there is a failure to reject the null hypothesis in all three cases for the comprehensive model.     
 This failure to reject the null hypothesis in the comprehensive model need not 
completely erase the implication that voting does in fact follow neoclassical principles however.  
The industrial employment composition of a district plays a strong and significant role in the 
voting behavior.  First, keeping in line to some degree with the original hypothesis, the 
percentage of workers in the high skill service industries have a positive and significant effect 
on voting in favor of the Panama agreement.  This indirectly confirms the notion that is trying 
to be achieved:  the U.S. is widely considered an exporter of high-value services that in turn 
require an advanced education (Bhagwati et al, 2004; Gresser, 2012).  Indeed, looking at the 
scatter plot in Figure 1, there is a strong correlation between employment in the high skill 
services and the skill level of a district.  The fact that this significant result only appears for one 
of the agreements in the comprehensive model however does not allow this argument to be a 
definite conclusion, but clearly there could be a suspicion of collinearity. 
In another specification presented in Table 5 however, where the high skill services 
variable is dropped, the coefficient for skill level is positive and significant for the Colombia and 
Panama agreements.17  Additionally, when the estimations are run in a preliminary specification 
in Table 3, where the only district employment driver is the skill level, the Panama vote has a 
positive and significant skill coefficient.  While these results from the separate specifications are 
not necessarily conclusive, they do provide some evidence that the skill level of a district may in 
fact play some type of significant role, especially in the Panama agreement.   
To further strengthen the argument that the skill level is in fact influential, consider the 
previously mentioned “factor-detachment” assumption (Beaulieu, 2002).  In Table 3, the 
presumption of running the model with this specification is that the skill level is representative 
of the industrial composition as a whole.  If one assumes that the skill level characterizes 
district industrial employment completely, such that there is not perfect factor mobility and 
                                                          
17 When run with state fixed-effects rather than regional fixed-effects, only the coefficient on Panama is significant. 
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workers are assigned jobs that are high-skilled or low-skilled based on their education solely, 
then it can be concluded that the relative factor abundance of a district is explanatory in the 
Panama agreement.  This assumption that the factor endowment can explain employment 
completely is very strong however, and it is appropriate to add in the industrial characteristics.   
Considering Table 5, the high skill services variable is dropped because it is highly 
correlated with the skill variable, having a correlation coefficient of 0.80 (R2 of 0.64).  Although 
the industries included in the high skill services variable produces goods and services that are 
deemed as highly tradable and should be included in the comprehensive model, it is not 
uncommon to drop a variable due to collinearity.  Thus this presents evidence that the skill 
level does in fact play some type of role in at least two of the agreements. In particular the 
strengthening of the coefficient’s significance in Panama to the 1% level compared to the 
specification in Table 3, where it is only significant at the 10% level, is an indication of the 
relevance of the explicit factor allocations for the agreement with Panama specifically.  It 
should be noted however, that since this result is not robust throughout all specifications, the 
failure to reject the null hypothesis cannot be overturned. 
Returning to the comprehensive model in Table 4, it can be seen that there is a very 
strong, positive and significant coefficient on the share of employment in the agricultural 
industry for all three agreements.18  It is especially strong with regards to the agreement with 
Colombia, where a one percent increase in the employment share of agriculture in a district 
leads to a 7.584 percentage point higher probability of the representative voting in favor of the 
agreement, significant at the 1% level.  At first glance, these general results for agriculture 
seems counterintuitive, as it has traditionally been considered a relatively labor intensive 
industry. With the advancement of technology however, one can imagine that the U.S. has 
turned agriculture into a more capital intensive industry (and thus a more high-skilled 
industry), and similarly the export statistics would reflect that this is certainly an area where 
the U.S. specializes in.19  Additionally, as mentioned in section 1.1, all three agreements include 
provisions that significantly and quickly reduce the tariffs and/or quotas placed on U.S. 
agricultural exports to each country.  Undoubtedly these beneficial provisions could have 
played a role in determining votes.      
                                                          
18 This result is robust throughout all specifications. 
 
19 According to the ITA, in 2010 the U.S. exported over $68 billion worth of agricultural products across the globe, 
compared to imports that totaled to around $42 billion 
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 Interestingly, the percentage of Asians employed in the district plays a significant role 
in two of the three agreements in Table 4.  Perhaps predictively, a one percent increase in the 
share of Asian employment in a district is associated with a 0.515 percentage point higher 
probability of voting in favor of the South Korea FTA, significant at the 10% level.  
Contrastingly, and maybe more perplexingly, the same increase is associated with a 0.497 
percentage point lower probability of voting in favor of the Panama TPA, significant at the 1% 
level.  There has been no indication that there was any competition between the signing of any 
of the agreements, so this result is a strange one.  There is not a significant effect from the 
Hispanic working population on the outcome for either Panama or Colombia in the 
comprehensive model, although in Table 5 where the high skill services variable is dropped, it 
appears to be positive and significant in both of these countries.  The broad ethnic references 
may be slightly off based and may need to be narrowed; however there is indeed some evidence 
that there may be a link between the countries trading with the U.S. and the domestic 
population with cultural or historical similarities to those trading countries. 
 The level of unemployment at the time of the votes plays a strong, negative and 
significant role in all three agreements in Table 4.  Most strikingly in the South Korea FTA, a 
one percentage increase in the unemployment rate in a district leads to a 5.045 percentage 
point lower probability of voting in favor of it, significant at the 1% level.  These results are in 
line with what is expected, and are more amplified in the South Korea FTA, possibly because 
South Korea is a relatively large competitor in the automobile industry, an area of the U.S. 
economy that has been hard hit by the recent recession.  This however could be a difficult 
argument considering the South Korea FTA also includes a number of provisions that benefit 
American automakers. As seen and explained in the literature however, the relationship 
between unemployment rates and free trade does not exactly lend to theoretical rationale.  
 This same argument used to elucidate the strong negative effect of the unemployment 
rate on the likelihood of a yea vote could also be used to interpret the coefficient on the 
percentage of workforce employed in the manufacturing industry with regards to the South 
Korea FTA.  There is a 1.148 percentage point lower probability of voting in favor of the South 
Korea agreement with every one percentage increase in the manufacturing employment share 
of a district, significant at the 10% level. This result is consistent throughout all specifications20 
                                                          
20 Though it should be noted, only the specifications using the regional fixed-effects.  When the comprehensive model is 
run with state fixed-effects, there is no significance on the coefficient. 
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and clearly reflects traditional domestic feelings towards trade with East Asian countries that 
specialize in manufacturing exports.  
 From the political perspective, considering the rather convincing summary statistics, it 
is not surprising that the coefficients on the political party to be strongly positive and 
significant, all at the 1% level.  This result would lead to the belief that the votes to some 
degree follow a certain party line, although in all three cases not enough to stop the agreements 
from going through.  Again, this confirms that generally speaking, it is expected that 
Republicans are more likely to vote in favor of trade liberalizing legislation.  It also seems that 
it does not matter whether a representative is a member of the House or Senate, as predicted, 
with all three coefficients statistically equivalent to zero.21 
 Finally, both types of PAC contributions have a strongly significant impact on all three 
votes.  Furthermore, they both have the signs that were expected.  The more money that is 
received from a labor PAC decreases the likelihood of a yea vote while the more money received 
from a corporate PAC increases the likelihood of a yea vote.  This result is not necessarily 
surprising, especially with the recent publicity given to the role that money plays in political 
campaigning with regards to the 2012 elections.  As seen from these results, the political 
contributions are in fact associated with voting on trade legislation.  This outcome also lends 
itself to an explanation of the S-S Theorem.  If the assumption is that labor PAC contributions 
come from the owners of the scarce factor, then a significant negative coefficient proves there is 
an effective channel to lobby for protectionism.  The same is true for the corporate PAC 
contributions, although having the reverse effect.  Comparing the coefficients between the two 
interested parties, in all three agreements, it appears that the same dollar contribution is 
relatively more influential in the deterrence of a yea vote via the labor PAC than it is in the 
encouragement of a yea vote via the corporate PAC.   
In summary, the comprehensive model displayed in Table 4 shows mixed results over 
whether a district’s relative factor endowment determines the voting tendencies on trade 
legislation, as theoretically hypothesized.  Explicitly, none of the coefficients on the main 
variable of interest, skill level (educational attainment), are significant, refuting the initially 
established hypothesis.  However, two different specifications do show that the skill level is a 
significant factor, for at least two of the agreements (with Panama significant throughout those 
                                                          
21 Although it should be noted that in the specification presented in Table 5, the coefficient on House is positive and 
significant for the Panama and Colombia agreements, indicating that members of the House of Representatives  were 
more likely to vote in favor of both agreements. 
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specifications). Even accepting the comprehensive model specification though, clearly it can be 
seen that, while political factors certainly influence the behavior, there are definite employment 
drivers within the district economic industries that help explain some variation in voting, most 
notably for all three agreements the percentage share of employment in agriculture.  Since 
employment in these industrial sectors is factor based as well, there is a notion that the S-S 
Theorem is being revealed through Congressional voting.   
5.  Conclusion and Discussion  
This thesis explores the theoretical relevance that theorems drawn from the neoclassical 
trade model holds with respect to voting in the United States Congress, specifically with 
regards to bilateral agreements with developing countries.  While traditional international 
trade theory has failed to empirically explain the actual trade flows of countries, the concept 
applied to Congressional voting behavior is equally valid.  It can be seen however, in the case of 
the three separate free trade agreements passed in 2011 between the U.S. and Colombia, 
Panama, and South Korea, respectively, that the same empirical problems face the law-making 
side.  The results show that there is no explicit association between the relative skill level of a 
Congressional district and the likelihood of a corresponding representative’s vote in favor of 
trade liberalizing legislation, when controlling for a comprehensive list of political and 
economic variables.  There is however some indication from different model specifications that 
at least for the Panama agreement, the factor endowment of a district does in fact play a role. 
 This broad failure to reject the null hypothesis may not accurately explain the entire 
relationship between the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and voting behavior.  Clearly from the 
results there are certain industrial employment drivers that influence the vote, specifically with 
regards to the share of a district’s employment in the agricultural sector.  This perhaps would 
lead one to believe that educational attainment may not necessarily be the most appropriate 
factor in determining whether the neoclassical theorems hold in this case.  An industry-focused 
model may be a more explanatory avenue, one that explicitly focuses on the share of 
employment in export-oriented industries. Indeed this would be similar to Beaulieu (2002), who 
compares the factor approach to the industrial approach and concludes that it is certainly the 
industrial approach that is better suited to explain the S-S theorem.  Looking at the results 
from the 2011 FTAs, there are arguments for and against the use the of the skill level factor 
proxy, so additional analysis from either side may be warranted. 
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 Reflecting on the additional results outside the scope of the specific research question, 
there are several intriguing outcomes from this empirical investigation.  With regards to the 
political considerations, the results seen in the majority of the literature hold throughout the 
three agreements.  It appears party politics are the norm even in the trade legislative realm, and 
there is a definite monetary impact with regards to political action campaigns.  This of course 
complicates any type of economic policy recommendations in the effort to tilt Congress towards 
more open trade legislation (without advocating for more corporate lobbying); however it 
would appear that since all three proposed bills were passed,  representatives are for the time 
being committed to freer trade.   
Examining the district-specific results, the dramatic negative effect unemployment rates 
have on the likelihood of a yea vote is unsurprising yet continues to be somewhat contradictory.  
According to the S-S Theorem, we would expect that if a district was relatively abundant in 
capital, then employment in the district would increase as a result of trade no matter the 
original rate of unemployment.  Of course the opposite holds true, but nonetheless it could be 
expected that these would potentially offset each other and render the unemployment rate 
insignificant.22  Knowing that this negative effect exists however, policymakers would do well 
to follow Kono’s (2011) recommendations and pursue social programs that alleviate 
unemployment pressure on the ability to pass trade liberalizing agendas.  The results with 
regards to the ethnic-specific employment of a district also suggests that strengthening ties 
with any prospective partner country’s migrant communities within the U.S. could increase the 
likelihood of a trade liberalizing agenda to pass.  
The drawbacks of this study are centered on the debate of whether skill, defined by a 
university degree, is an appropriate proxy for the factors of production.  It is conceivable that a 
Bachelor’s degree does not necessarily guarantee a high-skilled job, nor may it be completely 
accurate to assume that the same high-skilled jobs use capital relatively more intensively.  To 
address this to some degree, the same comprehensive specification given in Table 4 is presented 
in Table iv of the appendix, using the number of post-secondary institutions in a state, taken 
from the National Center for Education Statistics.  The results are largely the same as seen in 
Table 4, specifically with regards to no significance on the coefficients of the main variable of 
                                                          
22 In the specifications run with state fixed-effects, it appears that only the coefficient on the unemployment rate for the 
South Korea FTA is significant.  This would actually confirm the conclusions drawn in Section 4 with regards to the 
South Korea FTA specifically, although may weaken the interpretations for the unemployment rate as a factor in the 
grander scheme of FTAs in general.  
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interest.  Further, an argument could be made that land as a factor of production could be more 
explanatory than capital, especially since agriculture seems to be a decisive industry.  In Tables 
v and vi of the appendix, two proxies for farmland are used, with both specifications producing 
similar results to Table 4.  While these results given in the appendix lend some robustness to 
the industrial results, it is still difficult to conclude anything definitively from the factor 
perspective.  Further research in the area of alternative proxies is certainly necessary. 
Finally, there are collinearity issues with regards to the comprehensive model presented 
in Table 4.  While it is important to note this issue, as is done in section 4, the implications of 
this collinearity between employment variables are not immense.  Clearly, there are some 
variables that routinely lose or gain significance through specifications; however there are some 
definite robust results.  What can be conclusively stated about the S-S Theorem and its role in 
Congressional voting on the three 2011 FTAs is thus twofold.  First, there is proof that the 
explicit factor abundance of a Congressional district plays a positive role in the passing of the 
Panama agreement.  Second, in all three agreements, there are specific industrial drivers, that 
are factor based, that are influential.  While political factors outside the scope of neoclassical 
theory absolutely play a role in the voting, Congressional representatives do seem to take 
account of their district economic composition when voting on free trade legislation.  
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Figure 1:  Scatter Plot of Skill vs. High Skill Jobs  
 
 
 
Table 1:  Summary of Roll-Call Votes 
 Vote House/Senate Party 
Trade Legislation Yea Nay HoR S R D/I 
Colombia TPA 328 200 61.07% 66.67% 96.15% 21.90% 
Panama TPA 377 151 69.93% 77.78% 97.90% 40.08% 
Korea FTA 361 166 64.80% 84.69% 92.31% 40.25% 
Distribution of Votes 3 Yea 2 Yea 1 Yea 0 Yea Total  
Republicans 261 17 2 6 286  
Democrats  46 41 27 127 241  
Notes:  All votes took place on October 12, 2011, as a part of the 112th Congress.  There were 528 members who voted on both the 
Colombia and Panama TPA, while 527 voted on the Korea FTA.  The two columns showing “House/Senate” and “Party” show the 
percentage of representatives for each respective group that voted Yea on the respective agreement.  There were a total of 429 
members that voted in the House of Representatives and 99 members that voted in the Senate (98 voted on Korea).  SOURCE:  
THOMAS Database, Library of Congress 
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Table 2:  Summary Statistics 
Dependent variables Mean Std. Dv. Min. Max. Obs. 
Colombia Vote 0.621 0.486 0.000 1.000 528 
Panama Vote 0.714 0.452 0.000 1.000 528 
Korea Vote 0.685 0.465 0.000 1.000 527 
Control variables      
District Specific      
Skill Level 0.222 0.058 0.108 0.430 535 
Unemployment 0.085 0.022 0.027 0.203 535 
Agriculture 0.009 0.015 0.000 0.164 535 
Mining 0.006 0.012 0.000 0.092 535 
Utilities 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.017 535 
Construction 0.043 0.012 0.015 0.110 535 
Manufacturing 0.094 0.041 0.018 0.260 535 
Wholesale/Retail Trade 0.159 0.016 0.105 0.274 535 
High Skill Services 0.125 0.042 0.056 0.345 535 
Hispanic 0.276 0.337 0.009 0.989 535 
Asian 0.049 0.065 0.004 0.584 535 
Representative Specific      
Republican 0.540 0.499 0.000 1.000 535 
House 0.813 0.390 0.000 1.000 535 
Labor PAC  0.739 0.925 -0.001 4.290 529 
Corp. PAC  2.497 2.506 -0.010 16.995 529 
Regional Fixed-Effects      
Northeast 0.213 0.410 0.000 1.000 535 
South 0.310 0.422 0.000 1.000 535 
Midwest 0.245 0.463 0.000 1.000 535 
West 0.232 0.430 0.000 1.000 535 
Notes:  All district specific control variables are expressed as a percentage of workforce.  High Skilled Services is a 
composition of jobs in the Information, Finance and Insurance, and Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 
sectors.  Labor and Corporate PAC figures are presented as US$ (hundred-thousands).   
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Table 3:  Skill Specification 
Variables Colombia Panama Korea 
Skill Level 0. 407 0.563* 0.800 
 (1.057) (0.322) (0.723) 
Republican 0.552*** 0.322*** 0.358*** 
 (0.074) (0.052) (0.064) 
House 0.109 0.072 -0.065 
 (0.126) (0.050) (0.054) 
Labor PAC -0.289*** -0.135*** -0.140*** 
 (0.084) (0.042) (0.047) 
Corp. PAC 0.0788*** 0.047*** 0.076*** 
 (0.020) (0.013) (0.017) 
Unemployment -3.995* -1.663* -4.647*** 
 (2.169) (1.001) (1.692) 
Northeast -0.052 0.004 -0.147 
 (0.116) (0.033) (0.105) 
South 0.142** 0.052* 0.071 
 (0.069) (0.031) (0.052) 
West 0.132* 0.069** -0.040 
 (0.069) (0.032) (0.084) 
Observations 528 528 527 
Log Likelihood -134.94 -151.91 -186.71 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.6148 0.5193 0.4313 
Notes:  Table reports marginal effects of logit regressions. Midwest regional fixed-effect omitted due to collinearity.  
Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4:  Comprehensive Model Specification 
Variables Colombia Panama Korea 
Skill Level 0.575 0.010 -0.429 
 (1.375) (0.342) (0.967) 
Republican 0.582*** 0.326*** 0.419*** 
 (0.096) (0.059) (0.085) 
House 0.338 0.154 -0.110 
 (0.223) (0.103) (0.079) 
Unemployment -3.847** -2.240*** -5.045*** 
 (1.938) (0.690) (1.497) 
Agriculture 7.584*** 4.032** 3.914*** 
 (1.779) (1.469) (1.318) 
Mining -2.155 -1.257 -0.640 
 (3.878) (1.302) (2.503) 
Utilities -8.007 4.308 0.245 
 (13.633) (6.088) (12.878) 
Construction 5.604 -1.172 -0.2240 
 (3.925) (1.090) (1.691) 
Manufacturing -0.726 0.137 -1.148* 
 (1.006) (0.384) (0.608) 
Wholesale/Retail Trade 2.174 1.077 0.322 
 (3.917) (1.135) (1.787) 
High Skill Services 1.389 1.459** 1.487 
 (1.734) (0.709) (0.994) 
Labor PAC -0.297*** -0.121*** -0.131*** 
 (0.076) (0.036) (0.046) 
Corp. PAC 0.082*** 0.045*** 0.074*** 
 (0.018) (0.012) (0.016) 
Hispanic 0.227 0.078 -0.049 
 (0.160) (0.053) (0.131) 
Asian -0.273 -0.497*** 0.515* 
 (0.439) (0.182) (0.281) 
Northeast -0.129 0.059 -0.131 
 (0.174) (0.064) (0.114) 
South 0.061 0.021 -0.042 
 (0.109) (0.042) (0.085) 
Midwest -0.007 -0.078 -0.048 
 (0.138) (0.068) (0.070) 
Observations 528 528 527 
Log Likelihood -123.00 -136.03 -177.31 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.6489 .5695 .4600 
Notes:  The table reports marginal effects of logit regressions. West regional fixed-effect omitted due to collinearity 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are presented in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  . 
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Table 5:  High Skill Services dropped 
Variables Colombia Panama Korea 
Skill Level 1.576* 0.977*** 0.373 
 (0.935) (0.276) (0.746) 
Republican 0.568*** 0.322*** 0.416*** 
 (0.089) (0.057) (0.084) 
House 0.453** 0.337** -0.063 
 (0.197) (0.167) (0.084) 
Unemployment -3.888* -2.432*** -5.291*** 
 (2.042) (0.854) (1.609) 
Agriculture 6.996*** 3.306*** 3.228*** 
 (1.369) (1.206) (1.249) 
Mining -2.278 -1.400 -0.892 
 (3.881) (1.272) (2.548) 
Utilities -12.528 -0.669 -3.694 
 (13.665) (6.161) (13.235) 
Construction 5.257 -1.788 -0.589 
 (3.715) (1.367) (1.708) 
Manufacturing -1.051 -0.321 -1.470** 
 (0.892) (0.330) (0.597) 
Wholesale/Retail Trade 1.224 0.568 -0.468 
 (1.495) (0.757) (0.969) 
Labor PAC -0.301*** -0.127*** -0.135*** 
 (0.076) (0.038) (0.049) 
Corp. PAC 0.084*** 0.046*** 0.076*** 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.016) 
Hispanic 0.310* 0.163** 0.027 
 (0.160) (0.078) (0.117) 
Asian -0.373 -0.529*** 0.468* 
 (0.466) (0.194) (0.263) 
Northeast -0.178 -0.011 -0.220** 
 (0.130) (0.029) (0.098) 
South -0.015 0.078*** -0.083 
 (0.120) (0.026) (0.079) 
West -0.015 0.054* -0.049 
 (0.144) (0.033) (0.085) 
Observations 528 528 527 
Log Likelihood -123.58 -140.10 -178.85 
Pseudo R-Squared .6472 .5567 .4553 
Notes:  Table reports marginal effects of logit regressions. Midwest regional fixed-effect omitted due to collinearity.  
Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6:  No Skill Variable 
Variables Colombia Panama Korea 
Republican 0.588*** 0.327*** 0.412*** 
 (0.085) (0.057) (0.080) 
House 0.305 0.151 -0.084 
 (0.193) (0.104) (0.060) 
Unemployment -3.767* -2.130*** -4.990*** 
 (1.980) (0.675) (1.551) 
Agriculture 7.840*** 4.061*** 3.848*** 
 (1.756) (1.427) (1.415) 
Mining -1.917 -1.133 -0.517 
 (3.981) (1.311) (2.519) 
Utilities -9.266 4.057 -0.071 
 (13.138) (5.998) (13.378) 
Construction 4.971 -1.428 -0.129 
 (3.830) (1.067) (1.670) 
Manufacturing -0.554 0.129 -1.172** 
 (1.047) (0.373) (0.608) 
Wholesale/Retail Trade 1.874 0.987 0.087 
 (1.424) (0.601) (0.898) 
High Skill Services 2.203* 1.691*** 1.151 
 (1.293) (0.574) (0.852) 
Labor PAC -0.296*** -0.121*** -0.134*** 
 (0.077) (0.036) (0.046) 
Corp. PAC 0.083*** 0.045*** 0.075*** 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) 
Hispanic 0.194 0.073 -0.010 
 (0.154) (0.060) (0.120) 
Asian -0.127 -0.452** 0.434 
 (0.472) (0.198) (0.291) 
Northeast -0.129 0.010 -0.220** 
 (0.127) (0.025) (0.097) 
South 0.041 0.067*** -0.096 
 (0.082) (0.023) (0.081) 
West -0.005 0.051 -0.060 
 (0.155) (0.034) (0.092) 
Observations 528 528 527 
Log Likelihood -123.00 -135.43 -177.51 
Pseudo R-Squared .6489 .5714 .4594 
Midwest regional fixed-effect omitted due to collinearity.  Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7:  Specification Comparison  
 Colombia Panama Korea 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Skill Level 0. 407 1.576* 0.575 0.563* 0.977*** 0.010 0.800 0.373 -0.429 
 (1.057) (0.935) (1.375) (0.322) (0.276) (0.342) (0.723) (0.746) (0.967) 
Republican 0.552*** 0.568*** 0.582*** 0.322*** 0.322*** 0.326*** 0.358*** 0.416*** 0.419*** 
 (0.074) (0.089) (0.096) (0.052) (0.057) (0.059) (0.064) (0.084) (0.085) 
House 0.109 0.453** 0.338 0.072 0.337** 0.154 -0.065 -0.063 -0.110 
 (0.126) (0.197) (0.223) (0.050) (0.167) (0.103) (0.054) (0.084) (0.079) 
Unemployment -3.995* -3.888* -3.847** -1.663* -2.432*** -2.240*** -4.647*** -5.291*** -5.045*** 
 (2.169) (2.042) (1.938) (1.001) (0.854) (0.690) (1.692) (1.609) (1.497) 
Agriculture  6.996*** 7.584***  3.306*** 4.032**  3.228*** 3.914*** 
  (1.369) (1.779)  (1.206) (1.469)  (1.249) (1.318) 
Mining  -2.278 -2.155  -1.400 -1.257  -0.892 -0.640 
  (3.881) (3.878)  (1.272) (1.302)  (2.548) (2.503) 
Utilities  -12.528 -8.007  -0.669 4.308  -3.694 0.245 
  (13.665) (13.633)  (6.161) (6.088)  (13.235) (12.878) 
Construction  5.257 5.604  -1.788 -1.172  -0.589 -0.2240 
  (3.715) (3.925)  (1.367) (1.090)  (1.708) (1.691) 
Manufacturing  -1.051 -0.726  -0.321 0.137  -1.470** -1.148* 
  (0.892) (1.006)  (0.330) (0.384)  (0.597) (0.608) 
W/R Trade  1.224 2.174  0.568 1.077  -0.468 0.322 
  (1.495) (3.917)  (0.757) (1.135)  (0.969) (1.787) 
HS Services   1.389   1.459**   1.487 
   (1.734)   (0.709)   (0.994) 
Labor PAC -0.289*** -0.301*** -0.297*** -0.135*** -0.127*** -0.121*** -0.140*** -0.135*** -0.131*** 
 (0.084) (0.076) (0.076) (0.042) (0.038) (0.036) (0.047) (0.049) (0.046) 
Corp. PAC 0.0788*** 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.076*** 0.076 0.074*** 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Hispanic  0.310* 0.227  0.163** 0.078  0.027 -0.049 
  (0.160) (0.160)  (0.078) (0.053)  (0.117) (0.131) 
Asian  -0.373 -0.273  -0.529*** -0.497***  0.468* 0.515* 
  (0.466) (0.439)  (0.194) (0.182)  (0.263) (0.281) 
Northeast -0.052 -0.178 -0.129 0.004 -0.011 0.059 -0.147 -0.220** -0.131 
 (0.116) (0.130) (0.174) (0.033) (0.029) (0.064) (0.105) (0.098) (0.114) 
South 0.132* 0.050 0.061 0.069** 0.078*** 0.021 -0.040 -0.083 -0.042 
 (0.069) (0.081) (0.109) (0.032) (0.026) (0.042) (0.084) (0.079) (0.085) 
Midwest   -0.007   -0.078   -0.048 
   (0.138)   (0.068)   (0.070) 
West 0.142** -0.015  0.052* 0.054*  0.071 -0.049  
 (0.069) (0.144)  (0.031) (0.033)  (0.052) (0.085)  
Observations 528 528 528 528 528 528 527 527 527 
Log Likelihood -134.94 -123.58 -123.00 -151.91 -140.10 -136.03 -186.71 -178.85 -177.31 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.6148 0.6472 0.6489 0.5193 0.5567 .5695 0.4313 0.4553 .4600 
Notes:  The table reports marginal effects of logit regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Midwest regional fixed-effect omitted due to collinearity in first and second specifications (1) and (2).  West regional fixed-
effect omitted due to collinearity in the third specification (3).  Specification (1) is the results from Table 3.  Specification (2) is the results from 
Table 5.  Specification (3) is the comprehensive results from Table 4. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure i:  Breakdown of Votes by Chamber 
 
 
Figure ii:  Breakdown of Votes by Party 
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Table i:  Regional vs. State Fixed Effects (Comprehensive Specification) 
 Colombia Panama Korea 
Variables Regional State Regional State Regional State 
Skill Level 0.575 -0.036 0.010 0.193 -0.429 -1.467 
 (1.375) (1.789) (0.342) (0.410) (0.967) (1.449) 
Republican 0.582*** 0.730*** 0.326*** 0.401*** 0.419*** 0.543*** 
 (0.096) (0.073) (0.059) (0.075) (0.085) (0.095) 
House 0.338 0.706** 0.154 0.093 -0.110 -0.183*** 
 (0.223) (0.319) (0.103) (0.143) (0.079) (0.067) 
Unemployment -3.847** -1.015 -2.240*** -1.184 -5.045*** -5.577** 
 (1.938) (3.569) (0.690) (1.674) (1.497) (2.559) 
Agriculture 7.584*** 6.809*** 4.032** 3.708*** 3.914*** 5.015*** 
 (1.779) (2.023) (1.469) (1.391) (1.318) (1.769) 
Mining -2.155 20.988*** -1.257 -5.182 -0.640 -0.164 
 (3.878) (5.499) (1.302) (3.398) (2.503) (4.720) 
Utilities -8.007 -36.524* 4.308 2.614 0.245 0.717 
 (13.633) (20.049) (6.088) (10.015) (12.878) (16.831) 
Construction 5.604 3.424 -1.172 -2.827 -0.2240 0.002 
 (3.925) (3.490) (1.090) (2.121) (1.691) (2.467) 
Manufacturing -0.726 -2.357* 0.137 0.189 -1.148* -0.689 
 (1.006) (1.694) (0.384) (1.064) (0.608) (0.843) 
W/R Trade 2.174 5.076*** 1.077 1.968** 0.322 1.666 
 (3.917) (1.694) (1.135) (0.789) (1.787) (1.372) 
HS Services 1.389 0.994 1.459** 1.789* 1.487 2.812* 
 (1.734) (2.044) (0.709) (1.052) (0.994) (1.599) 
Labor PAC -0.297*** -0.304*** -0.121*** -0.135*** -0.131*** -0.120** 
 (0.076) (0.060) (0.036) (0.043) (0.046) (0.069) 
Corp. PAC 0.082*** 0.087*** 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.074*** 0.094*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) 
Hispanic 0.227 0.497* 0.078 0.034 -0.049 -0.120 
 (0.160) (0.290) (0.053) (0.088) (0.131) (0.187) 
Asian -0.273 0.403 -0.497*** -0.304 0.515* 0.913** 
 (0.439) (0.611) (0.182) (0.261) (0.281) (0.460) 
Northeast -0.129  0.059  -0.131  
 (0.174)  (0.064)  (0.114)  
South 0.061  0.021  -0.042  
 (0.109)  (0.042)  (0.085)  
Midwest -0.007  -0.078  -0.048  
 (0.138)  (0.068)  (0.070)  
Observations 528 480 528 440 527 455 
Log Likelihood -123.58 -81.49 -140.10 -103.06 -178.85 -128.39 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.6472 0.7478 0.5567 0.6285 0.4553 0.5648 
Notes:  The table reports marginal effects of logit regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Table ii:  Regional vs. State Fixed Effects  (Skill Specification) 
 Colombia Panama Korea 
Variables Regional State Regional State Regional State 
Skill Level 0. 407 -0.017 0.563* 0.752* 0.800 0.658 
 (1.057) (1.159) (0.322) (0.390) (0.723) (1.033) 
Republican 0.552*** 0.709*** 0.322*** 0.414*** 0.358*** 0.479*** 
 (0.074) (0.082) (0.052) (0.082) (0.064) (0.090) 
House 0.109 0.041 0.072 0.040 -0.065 -0.131** 
 (0.126) (0.130) (0.050) (0.052) (0.054) (0.054) 
Labor PAC -0.289*** -0.278*** -0.135*** -0.145*** -0.140*** -0.155** 
 (0.084) (0.076) (0.042) (0.050) (0.047) (0.037) 
Corp. PAC 0.0788*** 0.080*** 0.047*** 0.051*** 0.076*** 0.073*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) 
Unemployment -3.995* 0.150 -1.663* 0.186 -4.647*** -3.826* 
 (2.169) (3.142) (1.001) (1.745) (1.692) (2.310) 
Northeast -0.052  0.004  -0.147  
 (0.116)  (0.033)  (0.105)  
South 0.142**  0.052*  0.071  
 (0.069)  (0.031)  (0.052)  
West 0.132*  0.069**  -0.040  
 (0.069)  (0.032)  (0.084)  
Observations 528 480 528 440 527 455 
Log Likelihood -134.94 -98.21 -151.91 -115.42 -186.71 -134.73 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.6148 0.6960 0.5193 0.5840 0.4313 0.5434 
Notes:  The table reports marginal effects of logit regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Table iii:  Regional vs. State Fixed Effects (High Skill Services Dropped) 
 Colombia Panama Korea 
Variables Regional State Regional State Regional State 
Skill Level 1.576* 1.055 0.977*** 1.144*** 0.373 0.232 
 (0.935) (0.815) (0.276) (0.391) (0.746) (1.02) 
Republican 0.568*** 0.736*** 0.322*** 0.406*** 0.416*** 0.547*** 
 (0.089) (0.074) (0.057) (0.077) (0.084) (0.096) 
House 0.453** 0.768*** 0.337** 0.206 -0.063 -0.131 
 (0.197) (0.236) (0.167) (0.209) (0.084) (0.089) 
Unemployment -3.888* -0.243 -2.432*** -0.558 -5.291*** -4.656* 
 (2.042) (3.188) (0.854) (1.391) (1.609) (2.518) 
Agriculture 6.996*** 5.362*** 3.306*** 2.531** 3.228*** 3.523** 
 (1.369) (1.193) (1.206) (1.029) (1.249) (1.654) 
Mining -2.278 19.712*** -1.400 4.442 -0.892 0.026 
 (3.881) (5.088) (1.272) (3.070) (2.548) (5.379) 
Utilities -12.528 -45.478** -0.669 -7.051 -3.694 -13.161 
 (13.665) (20.849) (6.161) (9.297) (13.235) (14.430) 
Construction 5.257 2.938 -1.788 -3.636 -0.589 -1.326 
 (3.715) (4.959) (1.367) (2.309) (1.708) (2.290) 
Manufacturing -1.051 -2.695** -0.321 -0.214 -1.470** -1.199 
 (0.892) (1.093) (0.330) (0.791) (0.597) (0.887) 
W/R Trade 1.224 4.057*** 0.568 1.402** -0.468 0.258 
 (1.495) (1.447) (0.757) (0.662) (0.969) (1.406) 
Labor PAC -0.301*** -0.289*** -0.127*** -0.128*** -0.135*** -0.152** 
 (0.076) (0.061) (0.038) (0.043) (0.049) (0.070) 
Corp. PAC 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.076*** 0.096*** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) 
Hispanic 0.310* 0.559** 0.163** 0.100 0.027 0.021 
 (0.160) (0.270) (0.078) (0.095) (0.117) (0.191) 
Asian -0.373 0.313 -0.529*** -0.350 0.468* 0.784* 
 (0.466) (0.560) (0.194) (0.249) (0.263) (0.432) 
Northeast -0.178  -0.011  -0.220**  
 (0.130)  (0.029)  (0.098)  
South -0.015  0.078***  -0.083  
 (0.120)  (0.026)  (0.079)  
West -0.015  0.054*  -0.049  
 (0.144)  (0.033)  (0.085)  
Observations 528 480 528 440 527 455 
Log Likelihood -123.58 -82.10 -140.10 -105.90 -178.85 -130.76 
Pseudo R-Squared .6472 0.7459 .5567 0.6183 .4553 0.5568 
Notes:  The table reports marginal effects of logit regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Table iv:  Schools in a State 
Variables Colombia Panama Korea 
Schools -0.000753 -0.000204 0.000144 
 (0.000984) (0.000857) (0.00106) 
Republican 3.504*** 3.301*** 2.739*** 
 (0.681) (0.593) (0.569) 
House 1.822** 1.469** -0.777 
 (0.860) (0.691) (0.725) 
Unemployment -20.99 -28.13*** -36.67*** 
 (12.90) (9.299) (11.19) 
Agriculture 48.87*** 54.70*** 27.83*** 
 (10.68) (16.15) (9.371) 
Mining -11.19 -15.30 -3.808 
 (24.66) (18.37) (18.32) 
Utilities -53.29 56.52 -1.059 
 (81.12) (79.28) (97.26) 
Construction 28.07 -19.64 -0.613 
 (22.15) (12.78) (11.66) 
Manufacturing -3.022 1.807 -8.582** 
 (6.449) (5.070) (4.202) 
Wholesale/Retail Trade 10.28 12.93* 0.881 
 (8.948) (7.486) (6.791) 
High Skill Services 13.82* 22.72*** 8.333 
 (7.551) (6.270) (6.139) 
Labor PAC -1.806*** -1.614*** -0.974*** 
 (0.361) (0.289) (0.302) 
Corp. PAC 0.506*** 0.598*** 0.543*** 
 (0.0924) (0.107) (0.110) 
Hispanic 1.490 1.067 -0.135 
 (0.983) (0.686) (0.942) 
Asian -0.412 -5.908** 3.087 
 (2.660) (2.433) (1.981) 
Northeast -0.644 -0.676 -0.878 
 (0.852) (0.660) (0.598) 
South 0.280 0.221 -0.237 
 (0.742) (0.624) (0.586) 
Midwest 0.0371 -0.815 0.406 
 (0.889) (0.670) (0.577) 
Constant -4.667 -3.118 2.716 
 (2.933) (2.340) (2.106) 
    
Observations 528 528 527 
Log-Likelihood -122.82 -135.42 -177.50 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.6492 0.5715 0.4594 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table v:  Acres of Farmland in State 
Variables Colombia Panama Korea 
Acres -5.72e-06 3.14e-06 4.00e-06 
 (6.01e-06) (6.36e-06) (6.14e-06) 
Republican 3.493*** 3.320*** 2.785*** 
 (0.687) (0.606) (0.583) 
House 1.862* 1.059 -1.062 
 (1.042) (0.792) (0.933) 
Unemployment -25.34* -29.15*** -35.46*** 
 (14.06) (9.831) (10.41) 
Agriculture 45.92*** 53.59*** 28.26*** 
 (9.097) (17.07) (10.15) 
Mining -12.51 -17.09 -5.274 
 (24.77) (18.08) (18.22) 
Utilities -38.03 52.88 -6.561 
 (82.82) (80.03) (96.34) 
Construction 33.82 -17.24 -2.127 
 (23.13) (13.90) (12.73) 
Manufacturing -4.315 2.224 -8.397* 
 (6.057) (4.950) (4.295) 
Wholesale/Retail Trade 17.62 14.64 -1.502 
 (20.77) (14.20) (12.14) 
High Skill Services 11.43 20.20*** 8.166 
 (7.019) (5.948) (6.007) 
Labor PAC -1.784*** -1.579*** -0.960*** 
 (0.372) (0.290) (0.294) 
Corp. PAC 0.498*** 0.588*** 0.543*** 
 (0.0917) (0.109) (0.110) 
Hispanic 1.613 0.668 -0.429 
 (1.185) (0.847) (1.175) 
Asian -1.271 -6.192** 3.280 
 (2.772) (2.612) (2.265) 
Northeast -0.756 -0.582 -0.822 
 (0.862) (0.635) (0.597) 
South 0.349 0.255 -0.262 
 (0.731) (0.630) (0.600) 
Midwest -0.00431 -0.887 0.367 
 (0.895) (0.671) (0.579) 
Constant -3.375 -1.087 3.152* 
 (2.325) (1.788) (1.836) 
    
Observations 528 528 527 
Log-Likelihood -122.82 -135.42 -177.50 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.6492 0.5715 0.4594 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table vi:  Number of Farms in State 
Variables Colombia Panama Korea 
Farms -0.00356 0.00106 0.00256 
 (0.00327) (0.00319) (0.00315) 
Republican 3.508*** 3.308*** 2.785*** 
 (0.690) (0.602) (0.580) 
House 1.945* 1.142 -1.115 
 (1.120) (0.783) (0.905) 
Unemployment -24.74* -29.61*** -35.60*** 
 (13.80) (9.552) (10.20) 
Agriculture 46.54*** 53.45*** 27.82*** 
 (9.361) (17.07) (9.974) 
Mining -12.82 -16.68 -4.892 
 (24.35) (18.02) (18.07) 
Utilities -39.73 55.08 -6.860 
 (84.20) (80.10) (95.89) 
Construction 32.22 -16.18 -1.078 
 (22.65) (13.28) (12.58) 
Manufacturing -3.738 1.980 -8.655** 
 (6.181) (4.976) (4.250) 
Wholesale/Retail Trade 17.04 15.05 -1.395 
 (20.96) (14.15) (12.09) 
High Skill Services 11.50 20.25*** 8.168 
 (7.082) (5.925) (6.046) 
Labor PAC -1.784*** -1.583*** -0.956*** 
 (0.376) (0.290) (0.293) 
Corp. PAC 0.500*** 0.588*** 0.541*** 
 (0.0937) (0.109) (0.110) 
Hispanic 1.683 0.763 -0.468 
 (1.245) (0.833) (1.148) 
Asian -0.959 -6.322** 3.114 
 (2.819) (2.679) (2.234) 
Northeast -0.707 -0.615 -0.844 
 (0.834) (0.626) (0.595) 
South 0.468 0.232 -0.331 
 (0.789) (0.667) (0.633) 
Midwest 0.104 -0.908 0.295 
 (0.909) (0.681) (0.595) 
Constant -3.481 -1.168 3.176* 
 (2.424) (1.777) (1.831) 
    
Observations 528 528 527 
Log-Likelihood -122.82 -135.42 -177.50 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.6492 0.5715 0.4594 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Acronyms  
FTA:  Free Trade Agreement 
TPA:  Trade Promotion Agreement 
KORUS FTA:  Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (2011) 
NAFTA:  North American Free Trade Agreement (1994) 
CUSTA:  Canadian-US Trade Agreement (1989) 
GATT:  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (WTO, most recently Uruguay Round 
concluded in 1994; Doha began in 2001 and is on-going) 
TPP:  Trans-Pacific Partnership (on-going negotiations in 2013) 
PNTR:  Permanent Normal Trade Relations 
PAC:  Political Action Campaign 
H-O:  Heckscher-Ohlin 
S-S:  Stolper-Samuelson 
THOMAS:  not actually an acronym, the Library of Congress database is named in the spirit of 
Thomas Jefferson, who was the third President of the United States. 
DR-CAFTA:  Dominican Republic-Central America FTA 
MFN:  Most Favored Nation 
ITA:  International Trade Administration 
USTR:  United States Trade Representative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
